Publications

Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Epistemology: Protecting Knowledge (2024, Routledge)

Beyond Belief: On Disinformation and Misinformation (2023, Erkenntnis)

Conspiracy Theories, Populism, and Epistemic Autonomy (2022, Journal of the American Philosophical Association)

Epistemic Domination (2022, Thought)

The Epistemology of QAnon (2024, American Conspiracism)

Higher-Order Misinformation (2024, Synthese)

Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation (2022, Philosophy & Technology)

Social Evidence Tampering and the Epistemology of Online Misinformation (2024, Topoi)

Some Problems with Particularism (2022, Synthese)

What's Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising (2018, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements)

Where Conspiracy Theories Come From, What They Do, and What to do About Them (2024, Inquiry)

AI or Your Lying Eyes: Some Shortcomings of Artificially Intelligent Deepfake Detectors (2024, Philosophy & Technology)

Liars and Trolls and Bots Online: The Problem of Fake Persons (2023, Philosophy & Technology)

On Externalism and the Wheel Problem: A Reply to Matthews (2024, Philosophy & Technology)

Synthetic Media Detection, the Wheel, and the Burden of Proof (2024, Philosophy & Technology)

Video on Demand: What Deepfakes Do and How They Harm (2021, Synthese)

Group Minds as Extended Minds (2020, Philosophical Explorations)

Whose (Extended) Mind is it, Anyway? (2021, Erkenntnis)

Why the Self Does Not Extend (2020, Erkenntnis)

Ability, Knowledge, and Non-paradigmatic Testimony (2023, Episteme)

Collective Intellectual Humility and Arrogance (2021, Synthese)

Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem (2022, American Philosophical Quarterly)

Intellectual Virtue Signaling and (Non)Expert Credibility (2024, Journal of the American Philosophical Association)

Knowledge-how and False Belief (2021, Synthese)

Outward-facing Epistemic Vice (2022, Synthese)

Scientific Progress and Collective Attitudes (2021, Episteme)

How Individuals Constitute Group Agents (2019, Canadian Journal of Philosophy)

The Simulation Argument Reconsidered (2024, Analysis)